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Todd Haynes’s
short film, Dottie Gets Spanked (1994), is a
narrative about shame and identity, set in
pre-hippie Long Island. Six-year-old Steven
Gale wears red shoes and adores Dottie
Frank, the raunchy star of a I Love Lucy-like
television sitcom. The narrative scenarios of
The Dottie Show feed Steven’s imagination,
finding vivid expression in his drawings and
dreams. While Steven’s mother encourages
his passionate fandom, his father disap-
proves and other schoolchildren regard him
as weird. Visiting the TV studio set, Steven
is mesmerized by a scene where Dottie gets
spanked by her husband, seeing his adored
star switching between positions of submis-
sion and ultimate authorial control. Back
home he re-lives this experience by drawing
the spanking scene with his crayons and
colouring it in shades of red, yellow and or-
ange. Steven’s emotions vary from defiant
enthralment to shame, but his father’s ex-
pressionless face when seeing the drawing
confirms both the sexual charge and the
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queerness of his fantasy. After a nightly
dream featuring himself in scenarios of
masochistic pain and pleasure, Steven goes
to the backyard of the suburban home and
buries the shamefully passionate drawing.
But as the title of the film, a play upon Sig-
mund Freud’s 1919 essay “A child is being
beaten” implies, fantasies have a stronger
hold than that. In Haynes’s film, the im-
portance of fantasies for the structuring of
sexual and social subjectivity is underlined
by the fact that Steven buries his drawing
and, by implication, his illicit fantasy and
desire, wrapped in tinfoil, ironically making
sure that it will not moulder. Beyond a por-
trait of an effeminate boy, hence, Dottie
Gets Spanked depicts the formation of a
socio-sexual subject (de Lauretis 1994) in
terms of a tension between interiority and
exteriority, as a psychic life structured by
temporality and history of desires and
negations. In so doing, the film coincided
interestingly with concurrent developments
in 1990s queer scholarship and, in particu-
lar, with the development later termed as a
“turn to affect”. 
In 2007, South Atlantic Quarterly pub-
lished a special issue with the appropriately
provocative title “After sex? on writing
since queer theory”. While suggesting that
“queer theory” might be a phenomenon of
the past, the aim of the collection was to
take stock of the field by inviting well-
known contributors to reflect upon what,
in their research, is and is not queer. In the
introduction, the editors, Janet Halley and
Andrew Parker, describe the contemporary
research field by identifying and juxtapos-
ing “the so called anti-social thesis” attri-
buted to Leo Bersani and Lee Edelman,
and “the turn to affect”, associated with
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Lauren Berlant
and Ann Cvetkovich (Halley & Parker
2007:428). While Lee Edelman lives up to
his reputation by proposing “the wholesale
embodiment of the anti-social by non-
reproductive sexualities” and propagating
for “a project that’s willing to forgo the
privilege of social recognition” (Edelman
2007:470, 473), the South Atlantic Quar-
terly special issue does not (even attempt
to) do justice to the existing abundance of
queer scholarship on affect. 
In this essay, I argue in favour of Halley’s
and Parker’s identification of “a turn to af-
fect” as an important phenomenon within
queer thinking but, at the same time, I
question their casting of it against “an anti-
social thesis”. In my analysis, the descrip-
tion of the field of queer analysis as juxta-
position between these two does not hold.
On the one hand, despite different em-
phases, the same deconstructive impulses
and psychoanalytical frameworks inform
both approaches and their respective key
theorists. On the other hand, the “turn to
affect” needs to be understood as anything
but a unitary theoretical, methodological
or political move, featuring, rather, a range
of incommensurate critical positions. Fur-
thermore, it will be argued, Halley’s and
Parker’s description is misleading as it
clouds other, more fundamental lines of di-
vision within queer scholarship. Turning to
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s forceful and influ-
ential writings on affect, this essay unpacks
the notion of “turn”, rendering visible
both a particular politics of concept in op-
eration and the conceptual and metho-
dological tensions inhabiting the notion. 
AFFECT AND THE POLITICS
OF IDENTITY
Todd Haynes’s film was released a year af-
ter the first issue of GLQ: A Journal of Les-
bian and Gay Studies was published, featur-
ing ground-breaking articles by Eve Kosof-
sky Sedgwick and Judith Butler. The two
articles of the opening issue, Sedgwicks’s
“Queer performativity: Henry James’s The
art of the novel” and Butler’s “Critically
queer”, written partly in dialogue with one
another, established performativity as a key
concept for thinking about queer, and vice
versa. Whereas Butler’s article serves as a
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revision and further develops her argu-
ments on performativity in Gender trouble
(1990), Sedgwick’s reading of Henry
James argued for reconceptualizing shame
for the purposes of queer scholarship and
activism. While often rejected as a “toxic”
feeling to be turned into pride, Sedgwick
argued for an understanding of shame as
pivotal to understanding both identities in
general and queer identities in particular.
Furthermore, she argued for conceptualiz-
ing shame simultaneously as a foundational,
identity-forming affective experience and a
transformational, antiidentitarian energy. In
retrospect, Sedgwick’s article has with its
follow-ups been immensely inspiring for
queer scholars. Furthermore, its complex
argumentation has encouraged conflicting
readings, thus rendering visible the variety
of theoretical and methodological positions
that characterize queer theory today.1
In her article on queer performativity,
Sedgwick draws from developmental psy-
chology to contend that shame is “the key-
stone affect” in socialization of individuals.
Shame defines a space of identity, “the
space wherein a sense of self will develop”
(1993:5). With this gesture, Sedgwick dis-
tances herself from contemporary self-help
literature and conservative readings of
shame but, in evoking a theoretical frame-
work often regarded as a bastion of institu-
tionalized homophobia, she also challenges
the queer sensibility of her readers. In
Sedgwick’s reading, however, regarding
shame as a space of identity does not entail
understanding identities as essences. In-
stead, alongside the anti-identitarian mood
of early 1990s queer theory, Sedgwick sug-
gests reading the “place of identity” as
identity as “to-be-constituted” and, hence,
as “the question of identity” (ibid:14). 
In making this general argument about
shame and identity, Sedgwick combines a
reading of shame as performativity with
theories of developmental psychology. She
draws from both contexts to argue that
shame marks a threshold between inner
and outer. It is “the affect that mantles the
threshold between introversion and extro-
version, between absorption and theatricali-
ty, between performativity and – performa-
tivity” (ibid:8). It is in this sense, as bound-
ary-work, Sedgwick argues, that shame is
“integral to and residual in the processes by
which identity itself is formed”(ibid:13). 
While not wanting to define shame as a
queer emotion exclusively, Sedgwick never-
theless associates shame with the notion of
queer, linking it both to the formation and
to the questioning of sexual identities. Em-
phasizing the contingency of concepts, she
argues for historical specificity. In her
words, “at this historical moment” shame is
intimately associated with “lesbian and gay
worldly spaces” (ibid:13). Contending that
queer does not equal homosexuality, Sedg-
wick nevertheless uses queer in a quasi-
identitarian manner to refer to “this group
or an overlapping group of infants and chil-
dren, those whose sense of identity is for
some reason tuned most durably to the
note of shame”. She ended her article in a
foundational conclusion: “at least for cer-
tain (‘queer’) people, shame is simply the
first, and remains a permanent, structuring
fact of identity”. In this way, shame for
some is “an originary affect” from which
“particular structures of expression, crea-
tivity, pleasure, and struggle” develop
(ibid:13-14). Moreover, she defines the
very “political potency” of the term
“queer” by highlighting the childhood ex-
perience of shame as “a near-inexhaustible
source of transformational energy” (ibid:4). 
Both her arguments about identities in
general and queer identities in particular
feature a tension between a foundational
argument about the importance of shame
as a historical, identityforming experience
and an emphasis on shame as transforma-
tional, as “the work of metamorphosis, re-
framing, refiguration, transfiguration, affec-
tive and symbolic loading and deforma-
tion” (ibid:13). In this manner, Sedgwick
redescribes shame as a complex concept: a
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universal affect and a historically specific
subject formation, an affect explaining both
subjection to a norm or identity and its
contestation. Sedgwick explicitly rejects
readings of her article as a theory of homo-
sexuality, but she also denies suggesting a
theory of queerness ‘drained of specificity
or political reference’ (ibid:11). Shame is at
once devised as a generative and performa-
tive mechanism that engenders both queer
subjection and agency, providing inspiring
interpretive perspectives for many scholars. 
In retrospect, Sedgwick’s 1993 article
indeed initiated a “turn to emotion” in
queer studies, serving as a point of refer-
ence for most subsequent scholarship in the
field. While tapping, perhaps, like Dottie
Gets Spanked onto a momentum in queer
activism, it reconceptualized the question
of affect in general and shame in particular
as a timely topic and a new methodological
opening. If methodology is understood as a
discussion of concepts, of how they are de-
fined, used and to what ends and with what
effects, Sedgwick’s 1993 article is undoubt-
edly to be merited as initiating one of the
major methodological turmoils in the his-
tory of queer scholarship. 
The versatility of Sedgwick’s argument is
evident when regarding the broad range of
queer scholarship on shame by, among
others, Michael Warner (1999), Douglas
Crimp (2002), Sara Ahmed (2004), El-
speth Probyn (2005), Sally Munt (2007)
and Heather Love (2007). In the wake of
Sedgwick’s call, shame has been re-
described as a “special kind of sociality”
and a mode of “collectivity of the shamed”
(Warner 1999:35-6; Crimp 2002:66). The
Gay Shame conference at University of
Michigan (Halperin 2009) in 2003 docu-
mented this upsurge of queer scholarship
on shame, testifying also to the controversy
and contestation that the topic of shame
has aroused. Prior to the publication of the
conference presentations and discussions
which were were published in 2009
(Halperin & Straub 2009), Judith Halber-
stam questioned the politics of gay shame
in a 2005 Social Text special issue, “What’s
queer about queer studies, now?”. Ques-
tioning the agendas of the organizers and
speakers of the Gay Shame conference, Hal-
berstam criticized the queer attachment to
shame as “a white gay male thing”. In her
reading, the reclaiming of shame tends to
universalize the subject of shame, to ignore
the politics of privilege at play and to dis-
avow shame as “the gendered form of sexu-
al abjection” (Halberstam 2005:220-226). 
Notably, most authors in the Gay Shame
conference anthology cite Sedgwick’s 1993
essay or its revised and republished versions
as their key source on shame (Halperin &
Straub 2009), and for Halberstam (2005),
too, the centrality of Sedgwick as an ab-
sent, yet over-present theoretical authority
was an obvious provocation. For Sedgwick
herself, in the 1990s, the focus on shame
was followed by a turn to affect in both a
more general and more personal and self-
reflexive sense. 
AFFECT AS METHODOLOGY
In her 1997 anthology Novel gazing: queer
readings in fiction, Sedgwick introduced
the concepts of paranoid and reparative
reading. With the notion of paranoid read-
ing, she challenged what she perceived as
the dominant mode of queer and feminist
criticism: a practice of reading texts or oth-
er objects that seeks to reveal the hidden
workings of power, that is, the “bad news”
of homophobia they know in advance, ex-
pect to find and always end up confirming.
Discussing Judith Butler’s Gender trouble
(1990) and D.A. Miller’s The novel and the
police (1988) as examples, Sedgwick identi-
fies five characteristics for this approach
(Sedgwick 2003:130ff). 
Besides being anticipatory and fore-
stalling surprise, paranoid criticism is reflex-
ive and mimetic. A suspicious reader, in
Sedgwick’s analysis, ends up imitating and
reproducing paranoia, submitting both the
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object of reading and one’s reading to “a
process of vigilant scanning”. For example,
“a certain, stylized violence of sexual differ-
entiation must always be presumed or self-
assumed – even, where necessary, imposed –
simply on the ground that it can never be
finally ruled out” (ibid:130-133). As such,
paranoid criticism is “a strong theory” in
the sense of Silvan Tomkins: it has a wide
reach and geared towards rigour. A strong
theory draws its force from the wide spec-
trum of phenomena it accounts for by or-
dering “more and more remote phenome-
na to a single formulation” (Tomkins cited
by Sedgwick 2003:134). Furthermore,
Sedgwick characterizes paranoid criticism as
a strong theory of “negative affects” fol-
lowing Tomkins. According to Tomkins, a
paranoid is blocked against the general im-
pulse to maximize positive affect, an im-
pulse that, in this theory, is regarded as a
general force within each individual. At
best, a paranoid can strive for a defence, a
shield against humiliation. Lastly, Sedgwick
characterizes paranoid criticism as over-
invested in the power of knowledge and
the political efficacy of the form of expo-
sure and critical gestures of demystification.
(Ibid:133-137.) 
Against this “monopolistic program of
paranoid knowing” and “uniquely sanc-
tioned methodology” (ibid:144, 126) that
she criticizes as generalizing and tautologi-
cal, Sedgwick casts reparative reading, a
critical attitude that invests in hope, seeks
positive affect, surprise and wonder and,
therefore, assumes the risk of vulnerability.
In Sedgwick’s words: “to read from a
reparative position is to surrender the
knowing, anxious paranoid determination
that no horror, however apparently un-
thinkable, shall ever come to the reader as
new, to a reparatively positioned reader, it
can seem realistic and necessary to experi-
ence surprise. Because there can be terrible
surprises, however, there can also be good
ones” (ibid:146). Such a critical attitude,
Sedgwick argues, is “a vastly better position
to do justice” to the complexity of “queer
experience” and to practices that have been
“invisible or illegible under a paranoid op-
tic”. Rather than regularity and repetition,
reparative reading is attuned to contin-
gency (ibid:147). Moreover, instead of
hatred, envy and anxiety that characterize
paranoid readings, reparative reading seeks
nourishment, comfort and love (ibid:127). 
The metaphor of optic is significant as it
suggests that Sedgwick regards these two
critical positions, paranoid and reparative,
as a question of choosing lens and, hence,
as two alternative ways of seeing the world.
It is this explicit methodological focus and
the call for a new kind of research that
makes her conceptual distinction so com-
pelling. However, close-reading Sedgwick’s
discussion reveals (sic!) multi-layered and
contradictory argumentation. While on the
one hand outlining and marketing a para-
digmatic shift, on the other hand she un-
derlines the relatedness and the interdepen-
dency of the two critical positions. Further-
more, while emphasizing the need of both
optics for accounting for the complexity of
queer experience, Sedgwick’s discussion
suggests a distinction not only between
more and less ethical and hence good re-
search practice but also two distinct modes
of affective queer politics. 
On one level and importantly, Sedgwick
suggests a paradigmatic shift in queer
scholarship: a move from what she terms
“recent fixation on epistemology” to “ask-
ing new questions about phenomenology
and affect” (2003:17). In the introduction
to Touching feeling, Sedgwick frames her
focus on affect in more general terms, as a
way of taking issue with the styles of criti-
cism and theory encouraged by the linguis-
tic turn. Here, Sedgwick reflects on her
own research, distancing herself from Epis-
temology of the closet (1991) and coming
out as having taken “a distinct step to the
side of the deconstructive project of ana-
lyzing apparently non-linguistic phenomena
in rigorously linguistic terms”. Instead, she
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announces a desire to investigate “aspects
of experience and reality that do not pre-
sent themselves in propositional or even in
verbal form alongside others that do”
(2003:8). 
Significantly and, perhaps ironically, not
giving up the mode of figural reading, a
central method within deconstructive criti-
cism, Sedgwick challenges the topos of
depth and exposure as governing meta-
phors of queer theory. The target of Sedg-
wick’s criticism is what she terms “the
methodological centrality” of “hermeneu-
tics of suspicion” to queer criticism, “a
mandatory injunction rather than a possi-
bility among other possibilities” (2003:
124f). In the research programme she envi-
sions, Sedgwick rejects the thrust “to ex-
pose residual forms of essentialism lurking
behind apparently nonessentialist forms of
analysis”, “to unearth unconscious drives
or compulsions underlying the apparent
play of literary forms” or “to uncover vio-
lent or oppressive historical forces mas-
querading under liberal aesthetic guise”
(ibid:8). Instead of wanting to go beneath,
behind or beyond, Sedgwick gestures to-
wards “Deleuzian interest in planar rela-
tions” and chooses beside as her favoured
preposition that resists both dualism and
the narrative logic of origin and telos. For
Sedgwick, “Beside permits a spacious ag-
nosticism about several of the linear logics
that enforce dualistic thinking: noncontra-
diction or the law of the excluded middle,
cause versus effect, subject versus object”.
However, Sedgwick hurries to specify, it
does not “depend on a fantasy of meto-
nymically egalitarian or even pacific rela-
tions”. “Beside comprises a wide range of
desiring, identifying, representing, repel-
ling, paralleling, differentiating, rivalling,
leaning, twisting, mimicking, withdrawing,
attracting, aggressing, warping, and other
relations” (ibid). 
It is evident that for many, Sedgwick’s
discussion reads as an argument against
paranoid readings as reductive form of
knowledge. In the special issue of South At-
lantic Quarterly, Ann Cvetkovich (2007:
462f) summarizes reparative reading as “af-
fectively driven, motivated by pleasure and
curiosity, and directed towards the textures
and tastes, the sensuous feel, of one’s ob-
jects of study”. In this way, reparative read-
ing coincides with contemporary epistemo-
logical ideals of ethnographic and feminist
research: knowledge as situated, particular
and open-ended. In the same volume, Eli-
zabeth Freeman (2007:499) articulates a
protocol for this virtuous practice: “because
we can’t know in advance – we can know
only retrospectively, if even then – what is
queer and what is not, we gather and com-
bine eclectically and idiosyncratically, drag-
ging a bunch of cultural debris around us
and stacking it in eclectic piles ‘not neces-
sarily like any pre-existing whole’.” 
José Esteban Muñoz (2007:550) joins
this reading stressing the importance of
“shifting away from a hermeneutic that is
primarily attuned to the epistemological”.
In his argument, “doing away with femi-
nism, queerness, and race as epistemologi-
cal certitudes would open a site of poten-
tiality where these particularities exist as
methodologies that free new meaning”.
Echoing even if not citing Sedgwick’s criti-
cism of paranoid reading, he contends:
“We cannot know in advance the politics
prescribed by these critical modes, and we
should not”. It is through “a lens that reg-
isters affective particularity, relational sen-
suousness, and the intricacies of belonging
as friends, lovers, and beyond” that “per-
formative opening for a new sense of the
world” can be staged (ibid). 
Here and elsewhere, Sedgwick’s concep-
tual distinction has been interpreted as a li-
cense to “unapologetically theorize in a sen-
timental key” (Kelleher 2002:158). In
Cvetkovich’s (2007:463) words, “the em-
brace of affect within queer studies” has
“enabled new forms of personal voice in
academic work”, including “overt declara-
tions of love and other investments in our
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intellectual projects”. In his recent
overview of Sedgwick’s thinking, Jason Ed-
wards (2009:119) argues that she “encour-
ages us to consider not only what texts
make us think about, and what might be
wrong with them, but what precise plea-
sures, surprises and resources texts might
have to offer us, as well as how, what,
where and for how long texts make us
feel”. Moreover, Edwards diagnoses “a
profound reorientation of literary criticism
from the sentence ‘Shame on you’ to a pri-
mary emphasis on happiness – which – if it
made us more contented, undemanding,
trusting, peaceful and grateful, might trig-
ger off fewer negative, paranoidschizoid,
shame-filled, affective and relational spirits”
(ibid). 
In these interpretations, paranoid and
reparative readings are considered funda-
mentally different. One as a negative, de-
structive form of criticism; an amalgam of
programmatic and ideological approaches
that instead of producing “new know-
ledge” reproduces old truths, the same,
which we already know. The other, again,
open, positive, sensitive, healing, produc-
tive and innovative. Alongside the opposi-
tion of good versus bad scholarship, a dis-
tinction between ethical and unethical
approaches emerges. 
However, in her writing on paranoid and
reparative readings Sedgwick questions the
rhetoric of paradigmatic shift by underlining
how paranoid and reparative critical prac-
tices are to be understood as positions and
“changing and heterogeneous relational
stances” rather than “theoretical ideologies”
or “personality types of critics” (2003:128,
150). Indeed Sedgwick’s conceptual distinc-
tion emerges from her encounter with
Melanie Klein’s object-relations theory, an
alternative psychoanalytical tradition to
those of Freud and Lacan. The notions of
paranoid and reparative reading correlate
with Kleinian concepts of schizoid/para-
noid and depressive positions which, in
Klein, are fundamentally interlinked.
“Some fluctuations between the paranoid-
schizoid and the depressive positions always
occurs and are part of normal development.
No clear division between the two stages of
development can therefore be drawn; more-
over, modification is a gradual process and
the phenomena of the two positions remain
for some time to some extent intermingled
and interacting.” (Klein 1997:16)
In Sedgwick’s (2007:631; 2003:128) read-
ing, Klein sees in infants and adults alike a
dynamic of omnipotence and powerless-
ness, and emphases a “flexible to-and-fro
movement” between these positions. While
we are born into the fragile and violent
paranoid-schizoid position and triggered by
this “endogenous dread” engaged in the
primary defence mechanisms of splitting,
omnipotence and violent projection and in-
trojection, in Kleinian model, “middle
ranges of agency – the notion that you can
be relatively empowered or disempowered
without annihilating someone else or being
annihilated, or even castrating or being cas-
trated” offers “a great mitigation”, even if
it is always a “fragile achievement that re-
quires discovering over and over” (Sedg-
wick 2007:631f). 
While arguing eloquently for the versatil-
ity of Kleinian psychoanalysis against
Freudian theory, Sedgwick does not
ground her interest in her objects of re-
search. Rather, the focus is on the scholar –
herself and others – or a narrator, a subject
participating in and constructed within the
textual dynamic. Reading Sedgwick, two
literary examples emerge as paralleling the
distinction of paranoid and reparative read-
ings as critical positions. When discussing
shame in relation to queer performativity,
Sedgwick’s (1993) object of analysis is
Henry James’s The art of the novel (1934),
a collection of his prefaces to New York
editions of his novels. Close-reading
James’s prefaces, Sedgwick uncovers a dia-
logue and intersubjective tension between
two authorial selves and subject positions: a
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younger and an older James, a depressed
and a vindicated James. In Touching feeling,
the final volume of Proust’s À la reserche
du temps perdu (1913-1927) is in passing
invoked as an example of reparative mode:
in it, “the narrator, after a long withdrawal
from society, goes to a party where he at
first thinks everyone is sporting elaborate
costumes pretending to be ancient, then
realizes that they are old, and so is he – and
is then assailed, in half a dozen mnemonic
shocks, by a climactic series of joy-inducing
‘truths’ about the relation of writing to
time” (Sedgwick 2003:148). Sedgwick
closes her chapter by discussing reparation
as finding comfort: 
No less acute than a paranoid position, no
less realistic, no less attached to a project of
survival, and neither less nor more delusional
or fantasmatic, the reparative reading position
undertakes a different range of affects, ambi-
tions, and risks. What we can best learn from
such practices are, perhaps, the many ways
selves and communities succeed in extracting
sustenance from the objects of culture – even
of culture whose avowed desire has often
been not to sustain them. (Sedgwick
2003:150f) 
In this quote, Sedgwick moves between de-
tecting paranoid and reparative practices in
culture and history and characterizing
them as available, voluntary critical posi-
tions for today’s queer scholars. 
AFFECT AS HOPE
The force and the weakness of Sedgwick’s
conceptual distinction lies in her focus on
methodology. Sedgwick offers her concep-
tual distinction “not as a tool of differential
diagnosis, but as a tool for better seeing dif-
ferentials of practice” (2003:130). Her fo-
cus is on the affects of queer scholars, the
affective dynamics and its consequences
within the field of queer scholarship. When
discussing operations of shame in Henry
James, her ultimate interest is not in how
the affect is constructed or what it means in
the text, but in the effects of the affective
dynamic for the reading subject. Despite
Sedgwick’s repeated caveats, it is alluring to
read her as suggesting roads to reparation
for queer scholars. In the special issue of
South Atlantic Quarterly, the “turn to af-
fect” reads quite exclusively as a “turn to
interiority”. It is the affects of queer schol-
ars and the “field” that are at issue. Many
of the writers diagnose the affective state of
queer scholarship “after” what is perceived
as a loss of the transformational energy
since the first ACT UP-generation and the
beginnings of queer activism. The future of
queer thinking, it is implied, is a matter of
both therapy and critical self-reflection. In
other words, the “inchoate self” to be re-
sourced by the “additive and accretive”
reparative impulse stands out as the queer
scholar (Sedgwick 2003:149ff). 
In her criticism of focus on gay shame,
Judith Halberstam (2005) attacked the no-
tion of affect and its elevation into a
methodologically important tool within
queer scholarship. She questioned “the no-
tion that social change can come about
through adjustments to the self, through a
focus on interiority without a concomitant
attention to the social, political, and eco-
nomic relations”, and described it as a po-
tentially “a disastrous tactic for queer stud-
ies and queer activism” (Halberstam
2005:224). Halberstam related her critique
to that of Lauren Berlant (2002, 2008)
who, in her response to Sedgwick’s turn to
affect, has criticized the association of affect
with a politics of individualism: “Must the
project of queerness start ‘inside’ of the
subject and spread out from there?” Ac-
cording to Berlant, individuality, “that
monument of liberal fantasy, that site of
commodity fetishism, that project of cer-
tain psychoanalytical desires, that sign of
cultural and national modernity”, is a form
that needs “interruption” rather than affir-
mation (Berlant 2002:74). As a critic of
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“sentimentalization of culture” and the
politics of intimacy, Berlant is suspicious of
the “the very general sense of confidence in
the critical intelligence of affect, emotion,
and good intention”. In her reading, this
confidence shared by many feminists and
queer activists results in “an orientation to-
ward agency that is focused on ongoing
adaptation, adjustment, improvisation, and
developing wiles for surviving, thriving,
and transcending the world as it presents it-
self”. What this therapeutic language lacks
is a possibility to traverse or translate into
the political register (Berlant 2008:2).
Therefore, Berlant urges us to problema-
tize what she terms a “politics of true feel-
ing”: grounding feminist and queer politics
in emotions and granting emotions a given
explanatory value and status to organize
“analysis, discussion, fantasy and policy”
(Berlant 2000:35). 
As diversely developed by Sedgwick and
her followers, reparative criticism reads as
an investment in hope, in futurity. As Sedg-
wick writes in Touching feeling: “Hope, of-
ten a fracturing, even traumatic thing to ex-
perience, is among the energies by which
the reparatively positioned reader tries to
organize the fragments and part-objects she
encounters or creates” (2003:146). In this
approach, the task of criticism is to heal,
comfort and infer hope, and Sedgwick her-
self suggests that her turn to affect reflects
a shift in the more general structure of feel-
ing in queer communities. Whereas in the
1980s and early 1990s, the horror of the
AIDS epidemic and its public framings
called forth a paranoid position, the news
in the mid-1990s about possibilities to
treat HIV as a chronic disease brought
about new perspectives and a new sense of
futurity (Sedgwick 2007:638f). 
In Touching feeling, Sedgwick offers
reparative reading as a methodology for be-
side. While sharing many features with
Deleuzian feminist and queer theory
(Braidotti 2002, 2006; Nigianni & Storr
2008; Colebrook 2009) – the questioning
of the linguistic turn, the criticism of Judith
Butler and her followers, the focus on posi-
tivity and an emphasis on the ethical di-
mension of criticism – the Sedgwickian
method is ultimately at odds with it. Im-
portantly, the Kleinian emphasis on
schizoid-paranoid and reparative positions
as interrelated entails thinking along the
kind of on-the-one-hand/on-the-other-
hand -logic that Deleuzian approach rejects
as a negotiation of a given system (Cole-
brook 2008:27f). 
The late 1990s and early 21st century
have resulted in a mapping of queer and
feminist scholars, at least implicitly and
metaphorically, into two camps: those for
joy, those for melancholy; those for future,
those for death; those for reparative criti-
cisms, those constrained by paranoia
(Braidotti 2002, 2006; Colebrook 2008,
2009). The editors of “After sex? on writ-
ing since queer theory” have partly fallen
for this dualistic rhetoric in casting ‘anti-
social turn’ and ‘turn to affect’ – Lee Edel-
man and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick – against
one another. While this casting may seem
plausible in relation to the politics of hope,
various theories and implied methodologies
choose or choose not to engage in, it is
fundamentally inhibitive rather than pro-
ductive for queer scholarship. Importantly,
it conceals the politics of concept at play in
a ‘turn to affect’ (see Koivunen 2010).
While the question of affect for many
scholars is a question of epistemology and
methodology and, therefore, an opportuni-
ty for increased personal and political ac-
countability, for others it reads as a possi-
bility to move beyond the individual and
personal, and to relocate critical attention
from language, discourse and representa-
tions to the real, from body to matter, from
cultures to nature, from identity to differ-
ence, from psychic to social. Whereas some
view the concept of affect as a means to fo-
cus on the agency of the subject, others use
it to displace the concept of subject and to
radically rephrase the notion of agency it-
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self. If the turn to affect features a range of
different concepts and concomitant
methodologies, also the anti-social theory
as identified with Leo Bersani and Lee
Edelman has been criticized from within
(Halberstam 2008). 
Not acknowledging the distinctions and
contradictions within the “turn to affect”
(as above demonstrated in Sedgwick’s own
thinking and her critical legacy), the map
offered by The South Atlantic Quarterly,
furthermore, clouds other, perhaps more
important theoretical, methodological and
political faultlines within queer scholarship.
Notably, it conceals the divide between
theorists committed to notions of subject,
language and representation and those
choosing the new materialist vocabulary to
voice a critical perspective of beyond and
after humanism. The suggested divide ren-
ders invisible the shared theoretical and
methodological grounds – deconstruction
and psychoanalysis, although in different
versions, are after all, central to both Sedg-
wick and Edelman – but it also veils the
questioning of the linguistic turn and the
status of psychoanalysis that cuts across the
camps. Rather than clarifying key points of
difference or pointing out possibilities of
dialogue, the juxtaposition clouds a range
of fundamental disagreements concerning
the aims and stakes of queer scholarship. 
Returning to Sedgwick, the divide sug-
gested by Janet Halley and Andrew Parker
unfortunately omits all the ambivalence
that Sedgwick saw as the productivity of
her conceptual distinction. Whether or not
hope is a relevant criteria for assessing
queer theory, in the contemporary situation
where poststructuralist and Deleuzian criti-
cal vocabularies talk past and beyond one
another, addressing each other in capital
letters and with the powerful, affective
metaphors of life and death, Sedgwick’s
modest proposal seems productive: “My
own uncomfortable sense is that, for me at
any rate, activist politics takes place – even
at best – just at this difficult nexus between
the paranoid/schizoid and the depressive
positions” (Sedgwick 2007:637). A turn to
affect, hence, is more than yearning for
reparation and comfort as a researcher and
queer subject. Following her thought, the
future for queer scholarship entails a never-
ending movement between positions of
suspicion and trust, between a “terrible
alertness” to wrongs and injustices and mo-
ments of hope and comfort. Methodologi-
cally, Sedgwick offers no alternatives but
suggests a political and ethical obligation to
combine “schizoid” activism and self-assur-
ance with “depressive” self-doubt and criti-
cal reflection. Moreover, this combination
serves as a description of an ontological
condition as both dynamics are present and
potential in Sedgwick’s psychoanalytic un-
derstanding of the scholarly as well as the
textually constructed subject. In a Sedg-
wickian vein, therefore, a turn to affect is
an urge not to give up the notion of subject
but to continue formulating new questions
about it and to continue negotiating the
critical legacies of psychoanalysis. In this
way, close-reading Sedgwick’s version of
the turn makes visible how methodology
always reads as a politics of concepts. 
The research for this article has been fund-
ed by Academy of Finland and conducted
as a member of the Centre of Excellence in
Political Thought and Conceptual Change,
The Politics of Philosophy and Gender Re-
search Team (2006-2011). 
NOTES
1. The article and its key ideas has been published,
in revised versions, in Sedgwick 1995, Sedgwick
1997, Sedgwick 2003 and Halperin & Traub
2009. 
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ABSTRACT
Artikeln undersöker den så kallade affektiva
vändningen som enligt ett specialnummer
av South Atlantic Quarterly, “After sex? on
writing since queer theory” (2007), kän-
netecknar även queerforskning på 2000-
talet. Artikeln ifrågasätter existensen av “en
vändning” genom en närläsning av Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwicks inflytelserika skrifter om
skam samt om paranoida och reparativa läs-
esätt. Såväl Sedgwicks förståelse av skam som
hennes uttalat metodologiska reflexioner
kring queerforskning kännetecknas av kom-
plexitet och ambivalens. Detta bottnar i
hennes psykoanalytiska referensram och kop-
pling av affektbegreppet till subjektteori, till
skillnad från t.ex. nymaterialistiska ansatser.
Som en följd kan hennes idéer om paranoida
och reparativa positioner svårligen tolkas
som två väsensskilda metodologiska alterna-
tiv eller en värdering av två valbara,
sinsemellan alternativa läsesätt. Sedgwicks
begreppspar kan inte heller reduceras till en
inbjudan till forskare att “tala om” känslor
och upplevelser. I stället kan dessa två posi-
tioner, förankrade i Melanie Kleins psykoan-
alytiska teori, med fördel uppfattas som en
beskrivning av det queera forskarsubjektets
ontologiska situation: dess nödvändiga
pendling mellan negativ och positiv
hermeneutik, mellan kritisk granskning och
ifrågasättande av denna attityd, mellan
tvivel och hopp i sitt förhållande till världen.
I Sedgwicks tapp-ning innebär “affektiv
vändning” en utveckling av subjektteorier.
Hennes skrifter deltar i utmaningen av den
förra, lingvistiska vändningen men deltar i
dess dekonstruktion och vidareutveckling in-
ifrån, med dess kännetecknande teoretiska
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